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THE UNIQUENESS OF SURVEY EVIDENCE
Hans Zeiselt
"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recog-
nized . . ."*
Barely a decade ago, in a trade-mark confusion case involving girdles
for young ladies,' Judge Jerome Frank playfully supported his dissenting
opinion by a survey which he himself called "not satisfactory." In fact,
it was probably the worst survey ever made. He simply solicited his
daughter's and her girl friends' opinions.
Nevertheless, Judge Frank had a point. Sadly remarking that "neither
the trial judge nor any member of this court is (or resembles) a teen-age
girl," he felt that where the opinions of teen-agers are at issue nothing
but "information directly obtained" from them would suffice. Regretting
that he had no "staff of investigators like those supplied to administrative
agencies" he proceeded on the sound principle that any relevant informa-
tion is better than none.
By now, the science of making surveys has come into its own, and
with increasing frequency the courts are called upon to decide ques-
tions relating to the admissibility and use of survey evidence. Admin-
istrative agencies, not bound by the technical rules of evidence, will
usually admit a survey and then evaluate its probative power. In court
trials, especially jury trials, the issue of a survey's worth will first arise
when admissability is decided on. But whatever the formal occasion, the
evidential value of surveys is at issue. This paper is an effort to con-
tribute towards a better understanding of survey evidence, its value and
its limitations, within the legal framework which the courts have begun
to develop.3
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 347, for biographical data.
* Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
1 Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1948).
2 ... It has long been settled that the technical rules for the exclusion of evidence
applicable in jury trials do not apply to proceedings before federal administrative
agencies in the absence of a statutory requirement that such rules are to be observed.
Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 155 (1941).
3 A review of the law and literature through 1953 will be found in Lester E. Waterbury,
"Opinion Surveys in Civil Litigation," a paper delivered at the 1952 meeting of the American
Association for Public Opinion Research, 17 Public Opinion Quarterly 71 (1953) ; a revised
version in 44 Trade Mark Rep. 343 (1954); Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 498 (1953). A more
recent and more detailed, but less analytical, inventory can be found in Barksdale, The
Use of Survey Research Findings as Legal Evidence (1957). A review of the potentialities
and shortcomings of public opinion research, important for both the lawyer and the survey
practitioner, will be found in Blum and Kalven, "The Art of Opinion Research: A Lawyer's
Appraisal of an Emerging Science," 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1956). Appended (at 64-65)
THE UNIQUENESS OF SURVEY EVIDENCE
The unique value of a survey consists in its being the only means of
measuring the characteristics of a group where such a measure is at issue,
e.g., the proportion of people who confuse two trade-marks, the share of
a market held by a competitor, the level of wages paid in an industry,
the amount of timber burned in a forest fire, the proportion of items
manufactured below specific standards.
The two survey aspects which raise major legal issues are: (1) whether
the information is gathered through verbal statements made by the
survey interviewees, or only through observation, counting or measuring
by the field worker, and (2) whether the survey is based on a census
enumeration involving all members of the group, or merely on a sample
taken from that group.
The first problem raises the issue of hearsay. The second raises the
question as to how interviewing a few hundred people, or examining a
few specimens, can produce correct conclusions concerning many hun-
dred thousands of people or a whole shipload of merchandise.
Accordingly, for our purpose, surveys may be classified into four
groups: (1) Census surveys not involving verbal statements, e.g., sur-
veyors measuring the acreage of an area, and bookkeepers or accountants
determining the amount of a designated type of expenditure; (2) Census
surveys involving verbal statements, e.g., the standard job of the U.S.
Census; (3) Sampling surveys not involving verbal statements, e.g., the
job of the Food and Drug Administration in examining shipments of
merchandise, a survey of car license plates of patrons to determine their
geographic distribution,4 and certain phases of accounting work; 5 and
(4) Sampling surveys involving verbal statements, e.g., public opinion
polls and similar interviewing operations.
The major legal difficulties are compounded in surveys of type (4).
These public opinion poll surveys, therefore, will form the center of this
discussion.
The law has not yet developed a general rule for the treatment of all
survey evidence, although it is recognized that only two types of surveys
are clearly acceptable. Survey evidence produced by the U.S. Census,
although it is hearsay and frequently based on sampling rather than
9ccensus") operations, is clearly admissible. The other type of survey is
admissible, not because of its distinguished authorship, but because of
the nature of the collected information. If the interview answers are not
are comments by two distinguished social scientists, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Samuel A.
Stouffer.
4 This serves to establish the competitive position between retail outlets, or motion
picture theatres. See note 73 infra.
5 See infra p. 329.
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gathered "for the truth of the matter asserted therein" the survey will
be accommodated under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay
rule."
Surveys which do not fall into either of these two categories can gain
admittance only under the broader, less stringent approach (of which
the state-of-mind exception is but a special case) which weighs the
necessity of utilizing the evidence against the dangers of hearsay. Un-
less, therefore, a survey exception to the hearsay rule emerges at some
future time, the admissibility of survey evidence, as a rule, will hinge
upon the assessment of its worth.
In two recent cases, the sharp dividing line between state-of-mind
surveys and other surveys was softened. In one, a state-of-mind survey
was admitted because there seemed to be sufficient safeguards for ad-
mitting that particular hearsay evidence.7 In the other, a survey was
admitted "for the truth of the matter asserted" in spite of the fact that
it was made, because the hearsay dangers were found to be negligible
compared with the value of the promised information.8
The privileged status which the law accords to the operations of the
United States Census provides an appropriate introduction for our dis-
cussion because here, in a curious way, the law has solved, expressly or
by implication, all the major perplexities created by surveys and sampling
operations. Thereafter, we will consider the problems of sampling and
hearsay as they arise with respect to other surveys. Our discussion will
suggest that the true difficulties with survey evidence do not arise from
its being based on sampling operations or on hearsay. Rather, these
factors will emerge as the legal justifications for avoiding difficulties that
can probably be met more directly.
THE UNITED STATES CENSUS
Courts have not hesitated to take judicial notice of Census data, and
some state statutes make such data competent "prima facie evidence"
as a matter of law.9 This is so although all Census data are technically
hearsay, transferred as they are from the original respondent through a
long chain of staff workers. Furthermore, much Census data are based
on sample operations rather than a complete enumeration of all units.
One explanation for the fact that the sampling issue has never been
raised in connection with Census data is, perhaps, that so few people
know that many Census data are based only on samples. For instance,
6 See note 37 infra.
7 See note 39 infra.
8 See note 40 infra.
9 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1671 n. 11 (3rd ed. 1940).
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the Census income distribution for the United States population and
its subgroups is based on the questioning of every fifth household head.
Similarly, such household data as the "proportion of homes having
mechanical refrigeration" are based on replies from inhabitants in every
fifth dwelling unit. Yet the Census Bureau considers these findings not
significantly less reliable than actual "census" data. It is an obvious
waste of resources to ask a question of all respondents, if questioning
every fifth will yield results of sufficient, if not greater, accuracy.' 0
Even if the sampling nature of some Census data were better known,
it is improbable that it would be used to impeach their accuracy. This
may be inferred from the emphatic court endorsement of the counting
procedures of an official institution of much lesser standing. With respect
to a sampling examination conducted by the Federal State Seed Lab-
oratory in Alabama, a court said:
Reports which are of a public nature and taken under competent au-
thority to ascertain a matter of public interest are admissible in evidence
against all the world."
The survey operations of the Census have still another privilege vital
to the success of any continuous interviewing operation. By statute, the
information given to the Census enumerator is treated as privileged,
which makes it impossible to verify the obtained information by calling
interviewees as witnesses in court.
For survey operations not conducted by the U.S. Census or similar
public bodies, all three objections-that they are based on samples, that
they constitute hearsay, and that there is a reluctance to abandon the
anonymity of their interviewees-provide serious obstacles for the law.
One must ask, therefore, why a status given to the U.S. Census is being
withheld from other survey operations? Whatever the legal formula, the
true answer must lie in the confidence which the Census survey peculiarly
commands. This confidence derives from the disinterested character of
the Census operation and from the trust in its expertness.12 It is sus-
tained by the great simplicity and the factual character of most Census
questions, which leave little room for error.3
10 See note 25 infra.
11 E. K. Hardison Seed Co. v. Jones, 149 F.2d 252, 257 (6th Cir. 1945).
12 Compare, however, this passage in judge Caffey's opinion in the Alcoa case:
... I conceive of no reason for discriminating between private individuals and Gov-
ernment employees in formulating . . . what constitutes inadmissible hearsay.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 35 F. Supp. 820 at 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
13 Still another sample survey which is admitted almost daily without much legal argu-
ment in our courts, and probably without awareness that it is a sample survey, is the
mortality table, submitted as proof of the average life expectancy at any given age,
subject to modification by special trials of the particular individual.
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SAMPLING PRINCIPLES
Most surveys are based on samples because, practically speaking, there
is no other way of conducting them. There are even a few situations
where a complete census enumeration is not merely impracticable but
impossible because the census would destroy the entire group to be
measured. This is inevitable whenever the examination involves the
destruction of the examined unit, as in most laboratory examinations of
food and drugs. 4 Similarly, sampling naturally recommends itself when-
ever the universe (the technical term for the group from which a sample
is taken) is either physically unavailable or remains undetermined as to
its ultimate size. Estimating the value of burned timber is an example
of the first; '5 estimating the potential loss of bus fare from a projected
change-over to one-way traffic is illustrative of the second. 6
The most frequent and, in the long run, most important advantage of
samples is their overwhelming economy as compared to the often pro-
hibitive costs of the census operation. While most universes would permit
a census survey in theory, its costs, in terms of money and time, as a
rule, are prohibitive. In an early attempt to approach something like a
census survey in a Federal Trade Commission case, one of the commis-
sioners voiced this eloquent protest:
I want to register my protest at the way in which this case was conducted.
About a thousand witnesses . . . were permitted to testify as to whether
the use of the word 'Castile' when applied to a soap not made exclusively
of olive oil, had the tendency to deceive the public .... [T]his piling up
of cumulative evidence is an inexcusable outrage on the public .... The
attorneys and the trial examiner traveled throughout the country for the
purpose of taking the testimony of such witnesses. About 700 such were
subpoenaed to testify at Spokane .... [T] estimony has caused the F.T.C.
to waste hundreds of thousands of dollars. 17
Judge Wyzanski, in the Shoe Machinery Case, notes that "If anti-trust
trials are to be kept manageable, samples must be used."' 8
14 ... [a] test(s) . . . results in the article's being rendered useless .... [Inspection
and condemnation on the basis of samples tested is dearly contemplated by the Act
[21 U.S.C.A. 334(c)].
United States v. 43 and one-half Gross Rubber Prophylactics, 65 F. Supp. 534, 536 (D.
Minn. 1946).
15 [The witness] took four sample plots in each 40 acre subdivision and estimated
the destroyed merchantable timber . . . . We are not convinced that any improper
elements entered into the estimates of the witness....
Feather River Lumber Co. v. United States, 30 F.2d 642, 643 (9th Cir. 1929).
16 The Court accepted a sample survey and the opinion evidence of an expert witness on
the ground that it was "dictated by necessity, there being no other way to establish the
probable loss of fares." Eighth Avenue Coach Corp. v- City of New York, 170 Misc. 243,
251, 10 N.Y.S.2d 170, 181 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1939), aff'd, 286 N.Y. 84, 35 N.E.2d 907
(1941).
17 From Commissioner Humphrey's dissent in Matter of James S. Kirk & Co., 12 F.T.C.
272, 289 (1928).
18 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 305 (D. Mass.
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Occasionally, a situation may arise where the universe to be examined
is finite and small enough so that the law, by insisting upon complete
enumeration, does not impose an impossible burden on the litigant. In
a California case, involving suit for overpayment of a local sales tax,
plaintiff offered an estimate of the overpayment based upon a sample,
but the court insisted upon an introduction of the complete count.19
The courts generally are familiar with the fact that a sample must be
representative of its universe. To state precisely what is meant by a
representative sample, we might start by recalling a most famous instance
of what was not a representative sample-the more than two-million
ballots of the 1936 Literary Digest poll which forecast Landon's victory
over Roosevelt. By relying on the voluntary response from people listed
in telephone directories, owners of automobile licenses, and its own sub-
scribers, the Literary Digest sample under-represented those social strata
which were to sweep Roosevelt into his second term. A representative
sample, then, is one in which all members of the group have an equal
chance of being selected. Such a sample will represent all subgroups
more or less proportionately.20
The only way to insure an adequate representation is by some form of
lottery. A lottery, with all members of the universe susceptible of selec-
tion, is at the core of every sampling operation. The so-called systematic
sample, whereby every nth item or name from a list is selected, is but a
hidden form of lottery. It is implied that these nth units are in fact
random selections.2 The many variants and problems in sample design
do not so much derive from the basic and easily solved problem of se-
1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). Compare also the strong endorsement of survey evidence
in "streamlining the Big Case" Report of Special Comm. of the Section of Anti-Trust Law,
Am. Bar. Assoc., Sept. 15, 1958, p. 31.
19 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. The City of Inglewood, reported in Sprowls, "The Admis-
sibility of Sample Data into a Court of Law," 4 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 222-32 (1957). See also
note 34 infra.
20 Sometimes, however, if one wants to measure characteristics of a relatively small sub-
group it will be necessary to over-represent that sub-group in the sample (over-sampling)
so as to have a sufficiently large cross-section of the sub-group. If one wanted to com-
pare, for instance, households with and without automobiles, one might sample every
non-owner but only every fourth owner, so as to have equally sized samples of both groups.
21 judge Wyzanski used a sample of similar design:
At the Court's suggestion, the Government took and offered in addition to the OMR's
[Outside Machine Reports] depositions [a sample] of 45 shoe manufacturers operat-
ing 55 factories. The Court arbitrarily selected from a standard directory of shoe
manufacturers, the first 15 names that began with the first letter of the alphabet, the
first 15 names that began with the eleventh letter of the alphabet, all 8 of the names
that began with the twenty-first letter of the alphabet, and the first seven of the
names that began with the twenty-second letter of the alphabet. This sample covers 3
per cent of the shoe manufacturers. The sample includes small and large factories,
and concerns manufacturing shoes according to substantially the most popular shoe
manufacturing processes.
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 305. (D. Mass. 1953).
Such clustering, however, is not without danger since it may coincide with natural
clusters on the list, such as the names beginning with "Mc" or with "Rosen."
1960]
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lecting a representative sample,' but from the secondary difficulty of
selecting a sample with maximum efficiency, that is, with minimum costs.
LIMITATIONS UPON THE AccuRAcY OF SAM1PLE MEASUREEENTS
The price to be paid for accepting a sample instead of a census enu-
meration is a certain degree of uncertainty. This might seem a shocking
admission in an argument for the acceptance of sampling evidence. But
this shortcoming, as we shall see, is mitigated, first, by the fact that the
degree of uncertainty can be reduced to any desired magnitude (though
never to zero); second, because the law is rarely in a position to insist on
certainty; 23 and third, and most important, by the fact that census opera-
dons, too, are open to error. Experts insist that a sample survey, in spite
of its inherent uncertainty, can, at times, be more accurate than the cor-
responding census operation. 4
Let us first clarify the nature of this uncertainty in sample measure-
ments. Suppose we found that 68 per cent of the housewives in a sample
had bought at the XX food store chain. What can we say about the
corresponding percentage in the universe from which this sample was
drawn? Ignoring the technical niceties, the relationship is expressed as
follows: A range is set, extending in both directions around the sample
measurement, e.g., from 62 to 74 per cent, also written as 68 ± 6 per
cent. The probability that the true (universe) measure, if determined by
a census, will fall within this range is then determined. If in this par-
ticular instance the sample measurement of 68 per cent was derived
from a sample of 5,400 housewives, the odds will be 99 to 1 that the
22 The Federal Seed Act Regulations, 7 C.F.R. §§ 201.208-19, and especially §§ 201.210-
13 (1959) contain explicit sampling instructions and thereby acknowledge this underlying
principle.
23 ... [Allthough, admittedly such summaries are not, and could not be, absolutely
complete, they are the most accurate and most dependable data in existence to establish
this fact.
Hughes Tool Co. v. Ford, 114 F. Supp. 525, 542 (E.D. Okla. 1953).
24 The paradox is easily explained. Census operations are, by definition, gigantic tasks,
necessitating the hiring of a great staff, the quality of which eludes control. It is suggested
that population sampling surveys, in certain respects, would produce more accurate results
than the population 'census.' Some of the Census inaccuracies are well known: Reported
age distributions have a slight tendency to bulge at the round (10 year) intervals; transient
(hotel, etc.) populations are underrated; babies under 1 year similarly are underrated-at
the expense of babies who are reported as having reached their first year.
For the array of the survey problems the Bureau of the Census is confronted with, com-
pare Hauser, "Labor Force and Gainful Workers-Concept, Measurement, and Compar-
ability," 54 J. Sociology 338 (1949).
Compare, also, the following reference from a case before the Illinois Commerce
Commission:
The Company's evidence with respect to depreciation . . . was based primarily upon
a sample of the Company's property . . . . It was pointed out that the use of a sample
tends toward greater accuracy in the final conclusions, inasmuch as a reasonably in-
tensive inspection of the entire plant is virtually impossible considering the limitation
of time and money that should reasonably be imposed.
Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 7 P.U.R.3d 41, 606 Ill. Commerce Comm'n 493, 506 (1955).
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statement is correct that the true universe percentage will fall within
the indicated limit. Given a certain sample, the odds will be lower where
the narrower limits of the range are posted. In our example, the odds
will be about 19 to 1 that one is correct in asserting that the true value
will fall within 68 ± 4 per cent, and only 2 to 1 that they will fall within
68 ± 2 per cent, i.e., between 66 and 70 per cent.
A special case of this estimating procedure is acceptance sampling, a
customary practice in quality control of production and accounting. The
task is to determine, by means of a sample and in terms of agreed-upon
odds, whether the proportion of faulty items in the universe does or does
not exceed a specified tolerable minimum. If no faulty item is tolerable,
sampling must, of course, never be resorted to, as that item might be
hidden in the non-sampled part of the universe.25 But if some small pro-
portion of faulty items is tolerable, however small, a sample can be
designed to assure confidence odds for such a margin.26
This situation requires the survey planner to determine the necessary
accuracy of the sample measurement and to design his sample accord-
ingly. The accuracy with which a sample result can be projected depends,
as a rule, on two factors: the absolute size of the sample and the variance
of the property to be measured. The widely held belief that the accuracy
of a sample is connected with its relative size to the universe is mis-
taken.27 A sample smaller than 1 per cent, taken from one universe, can
be much more reliable than one comprising 10 per cent of another. To
determine with equal accuracy the average age of the population of New
York City and of Peoria, Illinois will require samples of equal size.
But if the size of the universe is immaterial, its variance is of great
importance. Assume we wanted to determine the mean age of two groups
of people and wanted to be sure of certain minimum odds that the sample
25 To think otherwise would be like the person who, in counting a bundle said to con-
tain 1000 one dollar notes, stops satisfied at 996 and exclaims: "If it was all right up to
now, the rest will be all right too."
26 Sampling, as a legitimate part of the accountant's practice, is acknowledged in Ultra-
mares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 191-92, 174 N.E. 441, 449 (1931).
The defendants [charged with having falsely certified a balance sheet] attempt to
excuse the omission of an inspection of the invoices proved to be fictitious by in-
yoking a practice known as that of testing and sampling. A random choice of ac-
counts is made from the total number on the books, and these, if found to be regular
.are taken as a fair indication of the quality of the mass .... Verification by .. .
sample was very likely a sufficient audit as to accounts regularly entered upon the
books in the usual course of business.
The court goes on to say that the sample in the present case did not excuse the omission,
not because sampling in itself is improper, but only because the crucial entry in the ledger
of assets, plainly interpolated and suspicious on its face, was excluded from the sample.
For technical details on sampling in accounting work, see Vance and Netter, Statistical
Sampling for Auditors and Accountants (1956).
27 Only in those rare cases where the sample becomes a sizable proportion of the
universe, say 20 per cent or more, do adjustments for approaching the size of the universe
need to be made in the formula.
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result be not more than 3 years off the true mean age of the sampled
group. Suppose, further, that one group to be sampled is the general
population of a city and the second is the residents in all the old age
homes of that city. Since age in the general population varies from zero
to approximately one-hundred, the general population will, for the same
degree of accuracy, require a larger sample than the old age home popu-
lation, whose age varies only between seventy and one-hundred.
The inverse relationship between variance and sample size is most
visible in the sampling of well mixed liquids; a drop of blood will provide
an accurate count of the blood cells per volume, because this percentage
varies little from drop to drop. There is, indeed, no more homogenous
universe than a well mixed liquid. Hence, even a very small sample
might yield an accurate measurement. Yet the following generalization
is not warranted:
[One of the] prerequisites necessary to the admission in evidence of
samples [is] that the mass should be substantially uniform with reference
to the quality in question.... 28
The court errs here, for also a universe with low homogeneity permits
sample measurements of great accuracy; it merely requires a corres-
pondingly larger sample. Uniformity or homogeneity or variance-the
three terms are used here interchangeably-is a matter of degree and
can be compensated by appropriate sample design and size.
Two points emerge; first, that the degree of accuracy of any sample
can be increased to the desired limit; and second, that the degree of
accuracy with which the sample is related to its corresponding value in
the universe can be stated with precision. Expert knowledge of the
sampling error is as unambiguous as the knowledge of the relationship
between a circle's radius and its circumference.
THE SAMPLING ERROR AND THE LAW
Sample measurements raise interesting legal issues. It might seem dis-
concerting that no sample measurement can be stated with complete con-
fidence in its accuracy. But, as we pointed out, the law is accustomed to
dealing with less than perfect evidence. Both standards of proof, "rea-
sonable doubt" and "preponderance of evidence," allow for imperfections.
Rather, it is the positive aspect of sample measurements that raises new
issues, i.e., the possibility of actually measuring the degree of uncertainty
or certainty through tolerance limits for the measurement at issue.
One way in which the law might deal with the problem is to accept the
28 E. K. Hardison Seed Co. v. Jones, supra note 11 at 256.
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range of the sampling error because any value within its range would
fulfill the immediate legal requirements:
For the evidence is all in one direction . . Different methods of
weighting the various factors would produce different results; but no
reasonable, qualified person would, by any rational process, reach a figure
outside that range; and probably most methods would reach a figure close
to the middle of it. Moreover, even though this high figure is not attained
in every part of the market, nonetheless the figure may be fairly used
since United supplies in every significant generic class of shoe machinery,
except machinery used in the cement process, and in rubber shoe manufac-
turing, and of course, excepting dry thread sewing machinery, far more
than 50% of the demand. In short, it is not inaccurate in this market to
say United has a 75-95% share; and it probably would be accurate to say
an approximately 85% share.29
Or the result of the measurement, however inaccurate, may clearly fall
short of the legal requirement:
... [P]laintiff did produce witnesses who testified as to confusion ....
However, considering that annually more than 70,000,000, rolls of plain-
tiff's ... mints are sold, to say nothing of many millions of packages of
other flavors ... it would be extraordinary if some confusion could not be
found irrespective of the details of the dress of the package .... A new
competitor is not held to the obligations of an insurer against all possible
confusion.30
In these cases the court found the magnitude of the sample measurement
so clearly above or below the relevant legal limits that it deemed it
unnecessary to put numerical values on these limits. In the following
opinion, however, full use was made of the possibility of measuring the
accuracy of a sample:
The Commission retained [an expert] . . . to analyze the Company's
sample of its plant to determine ... whether it was fairly representative of
the plant as a whole. He testified that in his opinion the sample was fairly
drawn and that the chance of it varying as much as 1% from the plant
as a whole was negligible. We conclude that the Company's sample should
be accepted as a fair cross-section of the plant as a whole. 31
The courts could go further and specify standards for sample measure-
ments since the sampling error can be reduced at will by enlarging the
sample. To be sure, there is a serious cost element to be noted. Since the
size of the sample error is inversely related to the square of the sample
size, the size of the sample must be quadrupled to reduce a sampling
error to one-half of its original size.
An interesting solution was proposed in the California case in which
29 judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., supra note 21 at
307.
30 Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4, 8 (7th Cir. 1950).
31 Illinois Bell Telephone Co., supra note 24.
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suit was instituted for overpayment of a local sales tax. Plaintiff offered
an estimate of the overpayment based on a sample survey as follows:
$28,250 with 2 to 1 odds that the true (census) value would fall between
$23,150 and $30,350, and 19 to 1 odds that it would fall between $23,950
and $32,450. Plaintiff voluntarily reduced his claim to $27,000, thereby
suggesting his willingness to absorb the greater part of the sampling
error. The court insisted on a complete census count, however, only to
discover that it yielded $26,750, a sum within 1 per cent of the claimed
amount.32
In most situations, however, the universe to be measured will be so
large that the court will not have the choice between a sample measure-
ment and a census, but rather, would either have to accept a sample
measurement or have no measurement at all. In the latter situation the
relatively inaccurate sample measurement may provide better evidence
than the law now possesses. That a sample value may be inaccurate by
some small margin of error could be of less importance than the fact that it
can provide a measurement as accurate as it does. This possibility be-
comes particularly important when the measurement refers to the core
of the litigated issue, and hence becomes a measure of the soundness of
the court's judgment or verdict. Two examples may be cited.
The owner of a gambling establishment, at his trial 3 for income tax
evasion, contended that his lottery wheel had retained, over the years in
question, some 11 per cent of the placed bets. The prosecution introduced
expert evidence to the effect that the laws of probability suggest that the
wheel (with its specific game rules) must earn, in the long run, some
22 per cent of the gross intake, that is, about twice the amount for which
the defendant argued. The prosecution might have gone one interesting
step further and offered evidence in the following form: "The odds that
the defendant's statement is true-that the wheel earned not more than
11 per cent-are one in a thousand" (or whatever the odds were, com-
puted from the rules of the game and the actual number and size of the
placed bets).
The use of blood tests in paternity suits provides another example. It
appears that, because of the possibility of accidental mutations, their
evidentiary value is not completely foolproof. On the average, it is esti-
mated that the blood test may err, by excluding the actual father from
parenthood, in one birth in 10,000. Because the paternity cases which
82 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. The City of Inglewood, supra note 19. The issue posed in
that case could provide a more general rationale for deciding the degree of accuracy that
should be required of a sample. The answer could come from asking these two questions:
(1) How much would it cost to increase the accuracy of the sample to a specified limit?
(2) What would be the dollar equivalent of this gain in accuracy for the issue at hand?
83 United States v. Sanders Scott, 55, 118 (7th Cir.) (unpublished).
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reach the courts are more likely to be among the few where the test fails,
it is estimated that the test would lead the court into error about 1 time
in a hundred. The question arises, therefore, whether, in view of this
fallibility, the blood test can still be accepted as incontrovertible proof.
The Danish jurist who drew attention to this particular aspect of the
problem suggests that blood tests be accepted as such proof. To permit
their impeachment by witness testimony could only increase a ratio of
error that is otherwise kept to 1 in 100."'
THE HEARSAY BAREER
Since opinion surveys reflect statements made by third persons to an
interviewer who, in turn, has related them to the analyst who may appear
as an expert witness in court, such evidence is clearly hearsay. But the
courts have developed a line of authority which exempts surveys from
the hearsay rule if the declarations are reported not "for the truth of the
matter asserted therein," but as expressions of the interviewee's state-of-
mind. Confusion of names and trade-marks provide the leading examples:
The hearsay objection is unfounded . . . . [T]he statements of the
persons interviewed were not offered for the truthfulness of their assertions
... [T] hey were offered solely to show as a fact the reaction of ... the
public... .Only the credibility of those who took the statements was
involved, and they were before the court.35
It is true that some of the hearsay dangers are reduced by an approach
of this kind; but they are by no means absent. Thus, while one may be
inclined to welcome any opening for the acceptance of survey evidence,
one cannot wholeheartedly endorse this particular one.
The state-of-mind doctrine has two disadvantages. It may make the
courts overlook technical pitfalls which are more likely to occur in state-
of-mind surveys than in other types of surveys. For example, the degree
of confusion of two trade-marks is, as a rule, the sum of two forms of
confusion: the specific confusion of the two trade-marks in question plus
the general confusion that will obtain for any comparison in an average
group of people under most test conditions. Clearly, unless the degree
of specific confusion is great, allowance must be made for the general.
34 Ross, "The Value of Blood Tests as Evidence in Paternity Cases," 71 Harv. L. Rev.
466, 483 (1958). He adds, significantly, that the courts in Denmark are inclined to accept
the blood-test exclusion as absolute proof with respect to children born out of wedlock,
but show greater reluctance in cases where the paternity of legitimate children is at issue.
35 United States v. 88 Cases, 187 F.2d 967, 974 (3rd Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861
(1951). See also People v. Franklin Natl Bank, 200 Misc. 557, 105 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1951), rev'd, 305 N.Y. 453, 113 N.E.2d 796 (1953), rev'd 347 U.S. 373(1954); Household Finance Corp. v. Federal Finance Corp., 105 F. Supp. 164 (D. Ariz.
1952). While public opinion polls become almost standard procedure in trade-mark con-
fusion cases, curiously enough, they have never been used to prove (or disprove) the
assertion that a trade name bad become a generic term.
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The more serious difficulty with the state-of-mind rule, however, is
that it provides no basis for admitting surveys of facts. In the latter
type survey, the hearsay danger is less than in surveys of states-of-mind.
Surveys which ask the respondents whether they own a gas stove, or
carry a certain brand of merchandise in their store, or have reached a
certain age, are not admissible under this hearsay exception. Surveys
asking for complicated psychological reactions are covered. Judge Wy-
zanski has noted this problem and has decided against the mechanical
application of the state-of-mind rule. After reviewing the positions and
citing authorities for each, 6 he concludes:
• . . So long as the interviewees are not cross-examined, there is no test-
ing of their sincerity, narrative ability, perception, and memory. There is
no showing whether they were influenced by leading questions, the en-
vironment in which questions were asked, or the personality of the investi-
gator. But where a court is persuaded that in a particular case all these
risks have been minimized, that the answers given by the interviewees are,
on the whole, likely to be reliable indicia of their states of mind, that the
absence of cross-examination is not prejudicial, and that other ways of
getting evidence on the same point are either impractical or burdensome,
the testimony should be admitted .... In this case these conditions have
been met. Accordingly, the hearsay objection is overruled and the testi-
mony of the results of the poll is admitted. .... 37
While this position considerably narrows the state-of-mind exception ap-
plicable to survey evidence, it must, in the long run, prove sound.
Another case which provides an opening wedge for surveys which can-
not be accommodated under the state-of-mind exception is United States
v. Aluminum Company of America.3 8 There, an expert testified to an
analysis of the records of 605 test holes drilled to determine the presence
and quality of bauxite deposits, although the persons who did the drilling
and prepared the reports were not present as witnesses:
Opinion testimony by an acceptable expert resting wholly or partly on
information, oral or documentary, recited by him as gathered from others,
which is trustworthy and which is practically unobtainable by other means,
is competent even though the first hand sources from which the informa-
tion came be not produced in court.39
36 Some authorities have, therefore, concluded that the testimony is not hearsay.
United States v. 88 Cases, 187 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1951); 6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d
ed.) § 1776; Note 66 Harv. L. Rev. 498, 501, 503, note 34. Others, however, have
noted that the proffered evidence has some of the dangers of hearsay. See Note 66
Harv. L. Rev. 498, 501-502; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the
Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 185, 202-203, 206; McCormick, The Border-
land of Hearsay, 39 Yale L.J. 489, 491.
American Luggage Works v. United States Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D. Mass. 1957).
37 158 F. Supp. at 53.
38 35 F. Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
39 Id. at 823.
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The court cites as precedent the opinion of Judge Learned Hand in G. &
C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publishing Company:4"
With respect to the matter, in what impresses me as unambiguous au-
thoritative judicial language, it has been said that 'the requisites of an
exception of the hearsay rule' are 'necessity and circumstantial guaranty
of trustworthiness.'
The court goes on to clarify the term necessity:
In effect, . . . necessity . . . is not to be interpreted as uniformly de-
manding a showing of total inaccessibility of firsthand evidence . . . but
that necessity exists where otherwise great practical inconvenience would
be experienced in making the desired proof .... 41
The opinion, standing alone, is limited. The information in question
was not gathered through interviews; hence it involves only one level of
hearsay; moreover, it had been gathered in the "ordinary course of
business" and only later used for purposes of litigation. Nor does the
decision refer directly to surveys but to expert testimony informed by
a survey. It could, however, be extended to the survey itself.4I
Let us now consider more closely the dangers of insincerity, faulty
narration, perception and memory as they pertain to survey evidence.
But let us be sure to see the problem in its precise form: the issue is not
whether the reliability of interview response would increase if all inter-
viewees could be examined as witnesses in court, since this is not an
available alternative. As a rule, it is not possible to bring the universe
or its truly representative sample into court. The customary procedure
is to call a number of public witnesses who allegedly are representative of
the universe. But a distinguished lawyer with broad experience in this
field had this to say about such a procedure: "The poisonous feature of
the public witness matter is ... that all too frequently they are selected
not impartially but because they will testify the way the party selecting
them wants them to testify."48 The very fact that such witnesses are
arbitrarily selected should render their testimony less credible. Even if
these public witnesses would, in fact, give a more reliable response in
court than to a survey interviewer, their evidence should be rejected on
40 207 Fed. 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1913).
41 Supra note 38 at 823-24.
42. . . [I]t may very well turn out to be that when the admissibility of survey evi-
dence is finally established beyond doubt, the rationale will be taken from the field of
expert testimony.
Waterbury, "Opinion Surveys in Civil Litigation," 44 Trademark Rep. 343, 362 (1954).
43 Id. at 347 Waterbury discusses this practice in detail. He notes its appearance in Stanley
Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 138 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1943), and Book-of-the-Month Club,
Inc. v. FTC, 202 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1953).
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the ground that these individuals do not adequately represent the uni-
verse,44 no matter how many of them are called.45
Assuming it were possible to bring a truly representative sample of
public witnesses into court, it is doubtful that their answers would always
be more reliable than those given to a survey interviewer. The inter-
viewee is in no way connected with the litigants, not even through the
tenuous bonds created by being a witness for one side. Moreover, the
interviewee will, as a rule, not learn the purpose for which his response
is used. In a proper survey routine, to prevent inadvertent disclosure, not
even the interviewer is told of the survey's purpose.48 In addition, since
the survey necessarily precedes the trial, less time will have elapsed
between the response and the event to be recalled, than between the
event and its deposition at the trial. Finally, the court has before it the
complete and uniform question schedule in response to which the survey
results were obtained. Court witnesses, on the other hand, at times under-
go careful individual preparation prior to trial, the form of which does
not necessarily come to the court's knowledge.
To be sure, court witnesses may have a heightened awareness of what
is at issue and may be more careful and perhaps more perceptive than
survey respondents who are completely unaware of the ultimate issuesY
Cross-examination, too, may prove its value at any time that recollection
or narration proves faulty. But even if some of the individual survey
responses are not, in fact, as totally accurate, 48 the group measurement
may still be sufficiently accurate within set tolerance limits.
In summary, therefore, the advantages offered by survey responses
should at least suffice to protect such evidence from outright disqualifica-
tion as hearsay. Moreover, the questions propounded in many cases will
44 The universe, of course, might be so small and accessible as to permit examination
in court of every one of its members.
45 Hence, it is wrong to believe that the evil of the procedure could be cured by calling
a sufficient number of witnesses ". . . except by calling as witnesses so many of the public
as to render the task impracticable." People v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, supra note 35 at 566.
A badly selected sample only becomes worse as it becomes larger. See note 64 infra.
46 "[The] witnesses were not informed of the purpose of this employment [a shopping'
survey]. . . .Always two went together so that there were two witnesses to each sale.'
Oneida, Ltd. v. National Silver Co., 25 N.Y.S.2d 271, 286 (Sup. Ct. Madison County 1940).
47 "Purchases of merchandise are not made in a vacuum with Professor Quiz in charge."
Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills Inc., 134 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1943).
48 Hence, Judge Arnold's concern in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297,
304 (D.C. Cir. 1944) is not quite to the point:
A corporation is engaged in taking a nationwide poll as to the number of members
of the Communist Party. In the regular course of that business . . . the inter-
viewer reports that X, Y and Z are Communists, giving excerpts from the conversa-
tions to support this opinion. The report would [not] be admissible . . . to make
a prima facie case that X, Y and Z are Communists ...Such evidence might be
used in a proceeding for the cancellation of a naturalization certificate.
To be sure, if the unreliability of the individual response passes a certain point, it may
invalidate a survey.
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be so simple, straight-forward and unambiguous that the hearsay dangers
must, in fact, be negligible. Hence, survey evidence, if properly procured,
is well covered by Wigrnore's formulation of the rationale that underlies
all exceptions to the hearsay rule: "Where circumstances are such that a
sincere and accurate statement would naturally be uttered, and no plan
of falsification be formed. .. .41
SURVEY INTERVIEWEES AS WITNESSES
Some court decisions suggest that a right of the adversary to call
survey interviewees as witnesses might help to overcome the hearsay
obstacle by fortifying the reliability of the survey evidence.5° Although
in some cases this procedure has proved feasible, and might seem ad-
visable in others, there are strong reasons against making it a general
requirement for the acceptance of surveys. Cross-examination of selected
survey interviewees is likely to be misleading. It may lend the aura of
reliability to an incompetent survey, or it may destroy confidence in a
survey which deserves better. Careful studies have shown that, on re-
interviewing, one always finds respondents who change their original
response. 51 These studies have also shown, however, that such changes,
as a rule, do not affect the reliability of the survey. This paradox requires
explaining although such explanation might, in fact, encourage the very
practice against which it is aimed.
A change of response may be due to any number of causes, e.g., simple
response error during either the first or second interview. Even on such
factual items as age, a small but definite group of respondents, on re-
interviewing, will give a different response. Moreover, changes may occur
which reflect opinions and attitudes which, in fact, may have been altered
between the two interviews. Finally, the very fact of having been pre-
viously interviewed, may precipitate the change. The artificial stimulus
of the interview may generate subsequent conversations or inquiries on
the part of the respondent which, in turn, will affect the original uncon-
taminated attitude. A subpoena and what follows may prove even more
49 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1422 (3d ed. 1940).
50 .. . nor any of the persons allegedly interviewed were called as witnesses. ... .
General Dry Batteries, Inc. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 45 Trademark Rep. 588, 594 (1955)---"Any
information he [the field representative] could give on the witness stand, would . . . have
amounted to hearsay based upon hearsay." Irvin v. State, 66 So. 2d 288, 291 (Fla. 1953).
The assurance that the interviewees could be called as witnesses was made a condition of
the admission of the survey in Everitt Hat Company v. Solcum Hat Company, Milwaukee
County, Circuit Court, July 11, 1955 (Wisc.), unreported opinion, quoted in Barksdale,
supra note 3. "The defendant did not attempt to fortify its survey through any such
witnesses." Oneida v. National Silver Co., supra note 46 at 287. Defendant subpoenaed 17
witnesses who had signed the survey. Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills, Inc., supra note 47
at 431.
51 Kendall, Conflict and Mood; Factors Affecting Stability of Response (1954).
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disturbing; before the cross-examination is finished, so many influences
will have become operative since the first interview, that a discovered
discrepancy would prove little or nothing. In such a case all the weight
would have to be accorded to the first response.
One might argue that there is some value in cross-examining a re-
spondent as to the circumstances of his being questioned and the mode
of recording his answers. But these same circumstances can also be
elicited from a cross-examination of the interviewers.
The discovery of discrepancies on the individual level need not in-
validate the survey results, for while some interviewees may switch from
position a to b, an approximately equal number will switch from position
b to a. The difficulty lies in the fact that if such occasional individual
changes are revealed in court through cross-examination, it may tend to
impeach the survey because the over-all compensating effect cannot be
shown.52
There is still another reason against encouraging this practice. Unless
the courts protect the survey interviewees from subsequently being called
as trial witnesses, bona fide surveys for purposes of settling legal issues
will become more and more difficult to conduct. The problem is en-
gendered not so much by the potentially large number of such witnesses,
but primarily by a peculiar condition under which surveys operate. In-
terviewers of private survey organizations are finding open doors and
willing respondents because they are scrupulously observing a canon
which they share with the Census interviewer. They will not voluntarily
identify individual answers by exposing their respondent. This assurance
is given either explicitly or implicitly by all reputable survey organiza-
tions. Their operations would come to a halt if it were known that an
interviewee might have to pay for his cooperation by being called into
court and there exposed to the doubtful pleasures of cross-examination.
The law specifically prohibits any disclosure of the answers of the re-
spondent in Census surveys in order to insure truthful response and to
avoid embarrassment. No other survey response enjoys this protection.
A private survey organization cannot assure its interviewees of confi-
dential treatment if the court orders the production of its survey ques-
tionnaires.53 The knowledge of this threat keeps many a survey organiza-
tion from accepting such legal work.
52 In cases of major importance, the survey organization may attempt to document this
by re-interviewing part of the respondents and comparing the paired results.
53 The issue arose before an FCC examiner concerning the sale of station WGMS. It also
arose during the hearings before an examiner for the U.S. Department of Labor concerning
a survey of wages paid in the electric lamp industry.
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There is a method of avoiding this dilemma.54 The identification of the
survey respondent can be written on a perforated section of the ques-
tionnaire and separated after the supervisor has passed it as satisfactory.
The separated names will form a record of all respondents, but since
none can be identified with any specific response, they can be cross-
examined only as to whether they had been interviewed at all. The mu-
tilation of questionnaires, of course, might be misinterpreted, but a proper
explanation should eliminate this danger.55
For these reasons, then, the cross-examination of the survey respond-
ents should not be required as a rule. In the vast majority of cases it
will not aid in the evaluation of the survey but might, on the contrary,
only confuse the issue. Whether the law, so hesitant to extend the area
of privileged communications, will soon respond to these needs is doubt-
ful.
THE IMPEACHMENT OF SURVEYS
The discussion thus far has tended to establish that neither the fact
that a survey is based on a sample, nor that it relates hearsay evidence
should, in itself, bar its admission into evidence. To be sure, there is the
danger that the weakness of survey evidence may be hidden under a
pretending surface. The following discussion will suggest that under the
guidance of expert witnesses any such defects can be satisfactorily ex-
posed and, hence, most danger avoided. The courts generally have re-
fused admittance to surveys in which they have discovered technical
flaws, rather than admitting them and permitting their impeachment. Ad-
ministrative agencies, on the other hand, are more liberal in their prac-
tice, partly because they are not bound by the ordinary rules of evidence,
and partly as a result of their familiarity with the specific technical prob-
lems before them. Moreover, many cases before these agencies are of
the sort that can hardly be decided without the assistance of survey evi-
dence.
A court sitting without a jury will seldom hesitate to admit a survey
in evidence. The Supreme Court has never either reversed or criticized a
trial court for admitting survey evidence in a civil case tried without a
54 It was employed in a survey by the Federal Food and Drug Administration in United
States v. 353 cases *** Mountain Mineral Valley Water, Civil No. 565, E.D. Ark., May 1956.
55 In a survey designed for an FCC hearing, the interviews were concluded with the
following statement:
As you may know, reputable survey agencies never make known any individual's
opinion without his permission. The sponsor of this survey is seeking an application
to operate the service we've been discussing with you. Would you be willing to have
your name referred to him in connection with the opinions you have just expressed?
This approach is straightforward, but must lead to self-selection of those respondents who
are more likely to stand by their outspoken opinions. The result must be a biased group
of witnesses of no value to the court.
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jury.56 The court may indeed admit a survey even if it has no confidence
in its probative value:
It is doubtful that such an exhibit [a survey of farm machinery outlets
in Iowa, conducted by the Statistical Laboratory of Iowa State College]
has any relevancy .... [B]ut the Court concludes that there is no need
to strike the exhibit. It may remain in evidence for what it may be
worth. However, it should be stated that the conclusion hereinafter indi-
cated ... would be the same in absence of this documentary evidence. 57
When sitting with juries, however, the courts prefer to exclude surveys if,
on preliminary examination, they find flaws in them, rather than admit
them for whatever they may be worth. Where the line between exclusion
and admittance ought to be drawn should depend upon how difficult it is
effectively to impeach a bad survey.
Improper Universe
There are three critical points at which a survey operation can fail and
provide ground for its impeachment. First, the survey may have been
directed at a universe which is irrelevant to the litigated issue. In such
cases of obvious error, the court will not need expert advice.
... [I]nterviewers stopped [the respondents] in front of one of the appel-
lant's stores in San Francisco and asked them in what manner they spoke
of 'Lerner Shops.' Obviously the results of such a survey are of little
value in determining what knowledge residents of San Jose had of 'Lerner
Shops' .58
Or,
, , * [T]he survey, having been limited to retailers, is inadmissible to
show that in the market of ultimate consumers the plaintiff's design had
acquired a secondary meaning.59
Inadequate Sample
It is not always obvious that a survey reflects an improper universe.
Sometimes it purports to represent the correct universe but, in fact, does
not do so. This is the second point at which a survey may prove in-
adequate. The universe may be properly selected, but the sample designed
to represent it may be faulty. At this point the expert's help, as a rule,
will be needed to explain the magnitude of unavoidable flaws or, as the
case may be, of any errors in sampling.
The quality of any sampling procedure depends both on its basic
design and its execution. The expert will readily discover its deficiencies
from the report itself, supplemented by internal documents and such
56 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., supra note 21.
57 United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856, 868 (D. Minn. 1951).
58 Lerner Stores v. Lerner, 162 F.2d 160, 162 (9th Cir. 1947).
59 American Luggage Works v. United States Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp. 50, 52 (D.
Mass. 1957).
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testimony from the survey staff as may be necessary. Questions directed
at discovering the manner in which a respondent was selected for inter-
viewing should provide all the information an expert will need. The sur-
vey staff, from the director down to the field interviewers, must be avail-
able for cross-examination. While cross-examination of all interviewers
should be avoided, the court should not refuse to hear as many as are
needed to clarify the exact modalities under which the survey was con-
ducted.
To detect deviations from instruction will require a more detailed
probing, primarily by questioning the supervisory staff and randomly
selected interviewers." Questions should be directed at the institutional
safeguards against error (substituting, without permission, respondent B
for respondent A) and against the admittedly rare occurrence of faking
parts or the whole of an interview. These safeguards may include proper
recruitment, training, and supervision of the field staff, as well as spot
controls and double checks of the particular survey sample.
One of the more easily overlooked sampling traps may arise from
what is technically called non-response. There are always some indi-
viduals in any sample from whom it is impossible to obtain the desired
information, either because they could not be located (e.g., were not at
home) or because they refused to answer the questions asked of them.
An effort to measure the size of broadcast audiences, for example, must
go far astray if it bases its findings only upon the people found at home.
It will exaggerate the true audience because such people are more likely
to listen to broadcasts than those who are away from home and, hence,
omitted from the survey. There are several techniques for dealing with
this difficulty, all aimed at an estimate of how the non-respondents
would have responded had they been reached and interviewed.
As has been pointed out, however, no sample is ever without short-
comings: the exigencies of costs, accidents, and other circumstances
may escape control and introduce bias. It is the expert's preeminent task
to enlighten the court as to the relevance of such flaws in respect to the
measured issues. The point is an important one, for even though a sample
have many flaws, it may be judged sufficient for deciding a particular
issue. The surveys of the late Dr. Kinsey are illustrative although, of
course, they have not come before the courts. The "Human Male" and
"Female" were represented only by those ill-assorted men and women
who, by one means or another, could be persuaded to be interviewed.
There is a standard method of estimating the survey's true value from
60 It is bad practice to permit the survey organization to present its best interviewer
to the court; a survey is only as good as its weakest link.
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such an improperly selected sample. First, the degree of under- or over-
representation of certain sub-groups is determined, e.g., too many college
educated, not enough laborers. One then estimates what the over-all,
corrected group average would have been had the sub-groups been repre-
sented in their true, known proportions."' While, of course, such estimates
lack the precision of probability samples, they will often be satisfactory
if the group measure clearly falls beyond the crucial minimum require-
ment. But more often, if a sample is improperly designed, the expert will
be- unable to appraise the size of its bias.
However, even a properly designed and well executed sample may
prove wanting, simply because it is too small to provide the desired
response, i.e., the sampling error may be too great. This difficulty may
derive from the fact that a sample can be sufficiently large to answer
some questions, but too small to answer others. Here, again, only the
expert can advise the court with precision."
Circumstances of the Interview
The third point at which the validity of a survey must be tested is at
its line of questioning and the circumstances under which the interview
was conducted. Lawyers know that there is more than one way of posing
a question and that the response in each case may be different. Such dif-
ferences may result from the phrasing of the individual questions, from
their sequence, or from the questioning situation. There is a body of
experience from which the expert will be able to guide the trier of facts.
He will detect bias where the layman sees none, he will know where
memory failure will tend to underrate and where vanity may have the
opposite effect, and he will know also when, at times, the interviewer's
personal opinion affects his respondent's answers.63
Yet it is axiomatic, in survey technique, that the danger of question bias
increases with the complexity and ambiguity of the questions. If their
aim is simple and factual, such as determining the make of the re-
spondent's automobile, neither the form nor the sequence of the questions
will make much difference. But in the survey question "As a guess, how
61 An example of this procedure can be found in Zeisel, "Sexual Behavior in the Human
Female," 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 517, 519 (1954).
62 It might be remembered that the issue of the adequate sample size becomes relevant
only with a good sample. As the Literary Digest experience showed, if a sample is wrongly
designed its being large makes it only worse, because it makes it less probable that the
systematic bias in sampling is cancelled, or at least reduced, by the sampling error working
accidentally in the opposite direction.
63 Hence, the requirement that the interviewer know as little about the purpose of the
survey as is compatible with his duties. For a complete examination of all such interview-
ing problems, compare Hyman, Interviewing in Social Research (1954).
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much wax would you say there was in glass wax... ," the court rightly
found "a built-in bias.""
In another case it was the sequence of questions which was found to
color the results. At issue was the confusion of "All State" and "All
States Life Insurance":
(3) What does 'All State' mean to you?
(4) If you wanted All State Insurance where would you go?
(5) Have you ever heard of All States Life Insurance Company?
(6) Who would you say owns All States Life Insurance Company?
The court, with justification, criticized the survey for "not fairly pre-
senting the name All State."65
Other aspects of an interview can also become grounds for criticism.
Word association tests given to students in a classroom were rejected
because their reactions were "bound to differ from that of the buyer in
the market place when confronted with the.., beverage .... "6 As an-
other court remarked, "the issue is not whether the goods would be con-
fused by a casual observer, but [rather] .. .by a prospective purchaser
at the time he considered making the purchase. If the interviewee is not
in a buying mood but is just in a friendly mood answering a pollster, his
degree of attention is quite different."67
A rather subtle source of bias was noted by a court68 in the selection,
as the interviewing area, of "the vicinity of Syracuse, which is not far
... from the town in which plaintiff's goods are manufactured," thus
producing an abnormally high degree of confusion with his brand.
Occasionally, the problem at issue will present genuine difficulties to
the interviewee. Such an issue arose at a recent hearing before an FCC
examiner concerning the sale of radio station WGMS in Washington,
D.C. When survey results purporting to show the audience's preference
for "classical" and "semi-classical music" were presented, it was con-
tended that the respondents did not understand the meaning of these
terms.69 The problem of ambiguity might be avoided by posing a battery
of questions, each of which would cover one facet of the ambiguous con-
cept.70 Together they would insure that the interviewee has responded to
all aspects of the concept.
64 S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1956), 40
Trademark Rep. 347, 357-58 (1950), aff'd, 90 U.S.P.Q. 373 (1951).
65 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 161, 171, 172 (5th Cir.
1957).
66 Coca-Cola v. Nehi Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 318, 326, 36 A.2d 156 (1944).
67 Judge Wyzanski in American Luggage Works v. United States Trunk Co., supra note
37 at 53.
68 Oneida, Ltd. v. National Silver Co., supra note 46 at 286.
69 52 Broadcast Telecasting Magazine 68, February 11, 1957.
70 Compare Lazarsfeld, Comment appended to the Blum and Kalven article, supra note 3.
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The hearsay problem also may arise as a result of survey techniques.
In Orbo Theatre Corp. v. Loew's, InC.71 the trial court refused to admit
a survey in which the respondents were asked about their movie going
habits and those of their families. This added level of hearsay constituted
one of the barriers for admittance of the survey.
By way of conclusion, then, we may say that a survey can err in at
least three basic ways:
(1) it may aim at an irrelevant universe;
(2) although aiming at the right universe, it may not be representative
because of faulty sampling, or it may be based on too small a
sample and hence render measurements that are not sufficiently
precise;
(3) the mode of questioning, the interviewing situation, or the se-
quence of questions may tend to reflect inaccurately the char-
acteristics at which the survey aims.
EXPERTS AND PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Courts and juries are presumed capable of judging the value of wit-
ness testimony. They are trusted to determine if such testimony is ir-
relevant or otherwise defective and without weight. Because of a tend-
ency to present survey findings in a way that makes them appear simple
and judgeable by the layman, the detection of defects in survey evidence
and the evaluation of its weight and significance is not a simple task.
Hence, no survey should be presented without accompanying expert tes-
timony. The expert will be needed precisely because of the surface sim-
plicity which almost all surveys, good or bad, tend to display. Thought
should also be given to the possibility of appointing impartial survey ex-
perts, either by agreement of the litigants or by choice of the court. They
would be analogous to impartial medical experts.72
Survey evidence has still another peculiarity which should guide its
use in court: its production is usually very costly and time-consuming.
To confront the adversary with a survey only at the time of trial will
almost always constitute an unfair surprise. Surveys, in this respect,
ought to be treated much like experiments which, in purpose and mode
of analysis, they closely resemble."8 Two procedural suggestions offered
by Professor McCormick in regard to experimental evidence can apply
without modification to survey evidence:
71 156 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1957).
72 See Chapter 11, discussing Impartial Medical Experts in Zeisel, Kalven and
Buchholz, Delay in the Court, (1959); see also Zeisel, "The New York Expert Testimony
Project: Some Reflections on Legal Experiments," 8 Stan. L. Rev. 730 (1956).
73 McCormick, Evidence § 169 (1954); Zeisel, Say It With Figures 132 (4th ed. 1957).
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... [T]he adversary system ... must be modified ... by a rule of
court providing first, that no experiment [survey] shall be used in evi-
dence unless reasonable notice shall have been given the adversary, with
an opportunity to make suggestions as to planning and to be present at the
test; and second, empowering the court, in discretion, on application of
either party, to appoint an impartial person to conduct ... an experiment
[survey] .74
Where both sides can agree on an impartially conducted survey, this
would have the added advantage of dividing the survey costs. 5
TOWARD A SURVEY EXCEPTION
The law with respect to survey evidence is still far from settled doc-
trine. Thus far, the development has been guided by fears that, since
most surveys are hearsay evidence, a bad one might too easily mislead
the trier of facts. But our discussion has shown that while the dangers
of an uncritically received survey are real enough, they derive not from
its hearsay character, but primarily from elements easily opened to ex-
pert review. If such expert help is available to the court and the parties
to the trial, the dangers arising from the admittance of survey evidence
are much smaller than is reflected by the rules which presently govern
their admission. These dangers will become negligible if, in the prepara-
tion and presentation of survey evidence, the following safeguards are
observed:
(1) All sampling plans, instructions to field workers, questionnaires
and other survey instruments ought to be available as evidence
of its design.
(2) The survey staff, from the director down to the ultimate field
workers, should be available for questioning as to the survey's
manner of execution. The survey interviewees, as a rule, ought
not to be required to testify.
(3) The survey evidence should be presented by an expert witness.
(4) If a survey is planned during the course of the litigation, the
court should explore the possibility of having the survey con-
ducted by stipulation of parties through an agreed-upon or court
appointed impartial expert. At that time, such technical require-
ments as size of sample and other specifications could also be
stipulated. If this should not prove feasible, a litigant intending
74 McCormick, Evidence § 169, p. 362 (1954).
75 . . . [Wihere contending parties ... can agree on the making of a survey (which
may or may not mean agreeing to be bound by the results of the survey), many if not
most of the really controversial problems about survey-making will be eliminated.
Waterbury, "Opinion Surveys in Civil Litigation," 44 Trademark Rep. 343, 361 (1954).
See also Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 498 (1953).
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to offer a survey in evidence should be required to notify his
opponent early enough to enable him to become an observer in
its development. If the survey was completed prior to the com-
mencement of the litigation, it should be disclosed to the ad-
versary well in advance of the trial.
If these safeguards are provided, the court should be satisfied that the
evidential value of the survey can be appraised objectively; hence, nothing
should prevent its admission, provided it is relevant to the litigated issue.
If these safeguards are not provided, the court ought to refuse to admit
the survey.
While the law might ultimately develop in this direction, its present
state gives only small encouragement. A reading of the Model Code of
Evidence and the proposed Uniform Rules of Evidence shows quite
clearly that the isolated cases in which survey evidence was admitted
are far from developing into a settled doctrine. The Uniform Rules do
not admit surveys unless they qualify under the state-of-mind exception
or, perhaps, as "entries made in the ordinary course of a business," this
exception would, at best, apply only to surveys made prior to, and un-
connected with, the litigation. However, since surveys provide the best,
if not the only, evidence on certain issues, and since expert knowledge
in the field has advanced sufficiently to protect the trier of the facts
from error, the law may well lower its heavy guard.
